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I. The regulation offinancial intermediaries in the EU 
I. Evolution of EU and Gennan law 
Securities law and the law goveming financial intennediaries was hanno-
nised on the European Ievel for the first time by the Securities Investment 
Services Directive in 1993.1 lt was replaced in 2004 by the Markets in Fi-
nancial Instruments Directive (MiFID 1)2. Following the financial crisis in 
2008, legislators across the world tightened up rules for financial intenne-
diaries, including the EU and South Africa.3 ln 2014, the second Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II) was passed,4 supplemented by 
the Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR).s The provisions 
of both are presurnably applicable in Member States as of 3 January 2018.6 
MiFID II can be seen as a "Single Rulebook" for all EU member states and 
is massive in scale.7 Furthennore, it includes extensive delegations to the 
Commission and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). 
The delegated and implementing acts of ESMA and the Commission are 
Council Directive 93122/EEC of I 0 May 1993 on investment services in the secu-
rities field (Securities Investment Services Directive). 
2 Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliameot and of the Council of 21 April 
2004 on markets in financial instruments (MiFID 1). 
3 Financial Regulatory Reform Steering Committee, lmp/ementing a twin peaks 
mode/ of financia/ regulation in South Africa available at http://www.treas-
ury.gov.za/twinpeaks/20 131211 o/o20-o/o201tem%203%20Roadmap.pdf ( 15-09-
2017). 
4 Directive 20 14/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 
2014 on markets in financial instruments and ameoding Directive 2002192/EC and 
Directive 20 11/61/EU (MiFID 11); Martin Weber, Neue Juristische Wochenschrij/ 
(NJW) 2014, 2327 (2328). 
5 Regulation (EU) No 60012014 ofthe European Parliament and ofthe Council of 
15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) 
No 64812012 (MiFIR). 
6 Art. I ofthe Proposal for a Directive ofthe European Parliament and ofthe Coun-
cil amending Directive 20 14/65/EU on markets in financial instruments as regards 
certain dates, 10.2.2016, COM(2016) 56 final. 
1 Niamh Moloney, EU Securities and Financia/ Markets Regulation (3rd Edition, 
2014), 339. 
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part ofthe Lamfalussy-11 Process, which is deemed to align the application 
and interpretation of the legal framework (regulation of directives) in all 
Member States. The European provisions of MiFID I are implemented in 
the Gennan Securities and Trading Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetzbuch, 
WpHG), and changes through MiFID II will be implemented by the end of 
20 17.8 Moreover, administrative regulationsfurther substantiate the provi-
sions ofthe WpHG. This Ieads to an overwhelming complexity on the Eu-
ropean and Gennan level.9 
8 MiFID II will be implemented in a "Second Financial Market Amendment Acf' 
(Second FiMaNoG). See Draft of the Gennan Federal Government for a Second 
Financial Market Amendment Acl available at http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/ 
btd/ 1811 091181 0936.pdf ( 15-09-20 17). 
9 Thomas M.J. Möllers, 'Harmonisation of Capital Markets Law- MiFID II and 
PRIIP' 31 (2015) Banking and Finance Law Review (B.F.L.R.) 143- 176. 
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2. The law goveming investment advice provided by investment firrns 
a) Scope 
The European and German approach to the reguJation of investment advice 
is different to the South African one: in Gerrnany, it depends on the institu-
tion giving the advice, and not on the product aJone. Moreover, different 
institutions may only give advice on specific products. ln tenns of scope, 
Section 31 et seq. of the WpHG only cover "investment firrns" 11 when of-
fering investment services including, inter aJia, the provision ofadvice with 
respect to investments in "financiaJ instrurnents"12• 
The WpHG or MiFID does not cover services in relation to insurance 
products. 13 Even though an inclusion of insurance fmns providing advice 
or selling insurance products has been discussed in the preliminary negoti-
ations about MiFI D II, 14 it was dismissed in the final version. 15 fn Gerrnany, 
investment advice with respect to insurance products is regulated by the 
Gennan lnsurance Contract Act (VersicherWlgsvertragsgesetz, VVG). ft 
uses very similar instruments as the WpHG, including inforrnation-based 
obligations.16 
II As defined in sec. 2(4) WpHG. 
12 As defined in sec. 2(2b) WpHG. 
13 See sec. 31 WpHG; Niamh Moloney, EU Securities and Financia/ Marlrets Reg-
ulation (3111 Edition, 2014), 341. 
14 See Repon on the proposal for a directive ofthe European Parliwnent and ofthe 
Council on markets in financial instruments, 5.10.20 12, A 7-0306nO 12, An. 3a, 
available at http :. www.europarl.europa.eulsides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-/IEP//NO 
NSGML+REPORT+A7-2012-{)306+0+00C+PDF+VO/IEN (15-09-2017). 
15 See Recital 87 of MiFID ll: "their different market structures and product charac-
teristics make it more appropriate that detailed requirements aresetout in the on-
going review ofDirective 2002/92/EC rather than setting them in this Directive". 
16 For an overview ofthe different obligations, see Christian ArmbrUster, Privatver-
sichenmgsrecht (20 13 ), paras. 614 et seqq., 717 et seqq. 
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b) Obligations according to Section 31 WpHG 
(i) General principle 
When providing financial services, an investment finn must comp1y with 
the fiduciary-like obligation to act honestly, fairly and professional1y in ac-
cordance with tbe best interests of its clients, and avoid conflicts of interest 
("fair treatment" principle). 17 
(ii) Special obligations 
The following duties prescribed in Section 31 (2}-{11) are addressed to mit-
igate principal-agent risks associated with the distribution of investment 
products. Where private ordering by disclosure-based controls fails to re-
duce conflicts of interests, regu1ators tend to introduce more interventionist 
approaches in the form of suitability and appropriateness tests. 18 
First, every product offered to retai1 clients or demanded by retail clients 
must be accompanied by a standardised information form, which allows the 
client to fully understand the associated risks (Section 31 (3) WpHG).19 
Furthermore, Section 31 WpHG involves different Ievels of obligations 
depending on the provided service to the retail client. In case of execution-
only transactions, the investment firm does not have to gather or provide 
more information than the above-mentioned (Section 31 (7) WpHG). In case 
of unsolicited orders, the investmentfirm needs to inform itself about the 
client's knowledge and experience with respect to the recommended finan-
cial products or investment field, to assess whether the product is suitab1e 
for the client and to warn the client if it is not (Section 31 (5) WpHG). Ifthe 
investment firm provides investment advice or portfolio management (Sec-
tion 31 ( 4) WpHG), it has to inquire from the client about his know1edge and 
17 Sec. 31(1) WpHG, Art. 24( 1) MiFlD I; see Thomas M.J. Möllers in Heribert Hirte 
and Thomas M.J. Möllers (eds), KK-WpHG (2nd Edition, 2014), § 31 paras. 82 et 
seqq. 
18 Niamh Moloney, ' Regulating the Retail Markets' in Niamh Moloney, Eilis Ferran 
and Jennifer Payne (eds), The Oxford Handhook of Financial Regulation (20 15), 
736 (758). 
19 Sirnilar to the South African regulation in sec. 7( I )(a) of the GCC (General Code 
ofConduct for Authorised FSPs and Representatives); see Darteen Millard, p. 198 
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31(3a) WpHG differs in several aspects from the European PRIIP-Regula-
tion.32 Therefore, the German investment law and the whole industry must 
adapt to the new European rules again. As the scope oftheGerman product 
information sheet is wider than the European scope, a combination of both 
laws will be relevant from I January 2018. The new Section 31 (3a) WpHG, 
as introduced by the "First Financial Market Amendment Act"33, states that 
where the PRJIP Regulation is not applicable, investment firms must still 
hand over the German product information sheet.34 This "solution" contra-
dicts the objective of information documents to provide a comparable sum-
mary among the different types of products. From next year, investment 
firms rendering investment advice must deal with three different categories 
ofinformation sheets in Germany: key investor information sheets (KilOs) 
for investment funds, key information documents (KIDs) for PRJIPs, and 
product information sheets (Produktinformationsblatt, PIBs) for all other 
financial instruments (for example, a simple share)_35 
Kf') loformatloa i)(Kamut, Prod11ct laformatloa .,~HI, 
PRnPR~I8tloa W<. J l(l•) \\ pll<.. 
- un/1/ J//ll0/7. alllinandal 
\lattrbl Sropt of 
tn>ltUllltnh ( e I · 'hare ) 
- onlyPRßPs - Q\ cif/ I !0/.~ a lllinan<aal ,\pplkatloa lll•trumenh exccpt PRIIP 
- only fllr 111\~•lm~nt a,h 1~e 
- PRIIP product manufacturen ba'e 
Ptno111l S<o~ of 
10 comptle key 111formahoo - PmHdc.lto chcnt by 111\ lmenl 
Applkatloa 
documeol ftrm - ProHded to chent by ad\1'>01' or 
;eil er 
fonaal - \ tanda.rdilo.Cd - ('CCIIied 111 Sc.: . ~~ WpDVctOV Rrqalft-at\ 






See Thomas M.J. Möllersand Mauritz Poppele. Zeitsclrriftfiir Unternehmens- und 
Gesellschaftsrecht (ZGR) 2013. 437 (459 et seq.). 
First Financial Market Amendment Act (First Fi\fa.NoG) from 30 June 2016. 
See Art. 2 No 5 ofthe First FiMaNoG (n 33). 
For an overview over the different categories, see Jochen citz. Adrian Juhnkc and 
Sven Seibold, Zeitschrif/fiir Bank- und Kapltalmarklrecht (BKR) 2013, I ct seqq. 
Authors' own Diagram. 
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c) Conflict of interest: fee-based vs. commission-based advice 
Giving investment advice is time- and cost-intensive, and investment advi-
sors are subject to considerable cornmission pressure. lt is not surprising 
that clients are often given recommendations for the product that generates 
the highest commission, even though it is not necessarily the one most suit-
able for their needsY 
lnducements38 are therefore only permissible ifthey allow or are neces-
sary for the provision ofinvestment services (Section 31 d(S) WpHG), ifthe 
inducement is from a third party commissioned by the client, or if the in-
vestment services enterprise grants such an inducement to such a third party 
(Section 31 d( I) sentence 2 WpHG). fnducements are also permissible if 
they enhance the quality ofthe service to the client ("quality enhancement 
test"), ifthey do not impair the proper provision ofthe service in the interest 
of the client, and if the existence of the inducement is disclosed (Section 
31d(l) sentence I Nos. 1-2 WpHG).39 
In addition to regulatory rules, the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) has 
interpreted a civil law advisory contract to include a duty to disclose any 
kickbacks. This interpretation has been heavily criticised, as it is clear to 
business partners that a commerciaJ servicewill only be provided for a fee.40 
(i) lntroduction of fee-based advice in Germany and the EU 
MiFID II was the first law on the European Ievel to distinguish between 
independent and non-independent investment advice. Fee-based advice can 
be found in the United Kingdom,41 the Netherlands and the USA.42 In Ger-
many, traditional advice is usually given free of charge. MiFID li requires 
37 Katharina Uffinann, Juristenzeitung (JZ) 2015, 282 et seqq. 
38 lncludes commissions, other fees or other cash, and any non-cash benefits: 
sec. 31 d{2) WpHG. 
39 See lngo Koller in Heinz-Dieter Assmann and Uwe H. Schneider (eds), WpHG 
(61h Edition, 2012), § 31d para. 27 et seqq. 
40 Hans Christoph Grigo1eit, 177 (20 13) Zeitschrift fiir das gesamte Handels- und 
Wirtschaftsrecht (ZHR), 264 (291); previous1y, Matthias Habersack, Wertpapier-
Mitteilungen (lfiM) 2010, 1245 (1251); Peter 0. M01bert, Wertpapier-Mitteilun-
gen (1f/M) 2007, 1149 (1160). 
41 Rules 6.2A.3, 6.2A.4A COBS, avai1ab1e at https://www.handbook.fca.org.ukl 
handbook/COBS/612A.htrn1 ( 15-09-20 17). 
42 Daniela Manzei, Wertpapier-Mitteilungen (1f/M) 2009, 393 (396). 
226 
Providing investment advice in light of MiF/D I and II 
advisors to disclose whether or not the advice is given on an independent 
basis.43 Fee-based advice prohibits payment of fees by third parties44 and 
requires a comprehensive market analysis. The fee-based advice may not 
be limited to financial instruments issued or provided by the investment 
firm itself.45 Although MiFID II does not have to be implemented until 3 
January 20 18, the German legislature has aJready passed the Fee-Based In-
vestment Advice Act (Honoraran/ageberatungsgesetz)46 in advance ofthe 
MiFID provisions. The new rules aJready take account ofthe MiFID II pro-
visions, including the general prohibition ofthird-party fees (Section 31 (4c) 
No 2 sentence 3 WpHG), and introduce a duty to disclose financial instru-
ments issued or provided by the investmentfirm itself or by entities having 
direct links with the investment firm (Section 31 ( 4d) sentence I WpHG).47 
43 Art. 24(4) sentence 2(a)(ii) MiFID II (n 4). 
44 Art. 24(7Xb) MiFID II (n 4). 
45 Art. 24(7Xa) MiFID II (n 4). 
46 Fee-Based Investment Advice Act (Honoraranlageberatungsgeset=) from 15 July 
2013; re Sections 31(4b), (4c), Sections 33(1) paras. Ja, 36c, 36d WpHG; see 
Thomas M.J. Möllers in Heribert Hirte and Thomas M.J. Möllers (eds), KK-WpHG 
(2nd Edition, 2014), §§ 36c, 36d paras. I et seqq. 
47 Foranother view on civillaw duty, BGH 19.12.2006 - XI ZR 56/05 - BGHZ 170, 
226, 233 para. 21 \.,.i th comment, Thomas M.J. Möllers and Thomas G. Wen-
ninger, Lindenmaier-MlJhring, Kommentierte BGH-Rechtsprechugn (LMK) 2007, 
220857. 
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Pre-c:ontrac:tual Information Requlrement 
whether Fee-ba ed or Conumsston-based Advtce, 
I 
I 
ec 31(4b) Sentence I 
Fee-based Advlce 
Duty of obJeCUvtly relatmg to recommended 
porducb. sec. 31(4c) Sentence 1 ~o l 
Probtbitton ofthtrd-party fees. 
e ., sec. 31(4c) Sentenc I No_ 
Dtsclosme of fUllUlcialmstrlU'Uents tssued by the 
mvestment ftrm itself of hnked wve tment ftrmS, 
sec. 31(4d) Sentence 1 
Probtbition of fixed-pnce transactions, 
sec. 31(4d) Sentence 2 





by thtrd parttes. 
sec. 31(4b) Sentence 2 
Fee-based Advice: Disdosure and Organisational Requirements48 
(ii) Commission's delegated directive 
During the legislative process, the EU Parliament had proposed to make it 
possible for Member States to entirely prohibit kickbacks for commission-
based advice.49 However, this rule was thrown out by the Economic and 
Monetary Affairs Committee ofthe European Parliament. Political discus-
sions now turn on the issue ofwbether only fee-based advice should be per-
mitted in the future. ESMA 's Consultation Paper dated 22 May 20 14 in-
cluded a forrnulation ofa prohibition on commissions.50 Afterprotests from 
48 Authors' own Diagram. 
49 Art. 24(5) of Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 26 October 
2012 on the proposal for a directive ofthe European Parliament and ofthe Council 
on markets in financial instruments repealing Directive 2004/39/EC of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council (recast), P7_TA-PROV(2012), 0406; see 
Thomas M.J. Möllersand Mauritz Poppele, Zeitschrift .fiir Unternehmens- und Ge-
sel/schaflsreclu (ZGR) 2013,437 (465, 471 et seq.). 
50 Commissions should not be permissible when they are only used to pa}' for or 
provide goods or services that are essential for the recipient firm in its ordinary 
course of business; see Consultation Paper ESMN2014/549 dated 22.5.2014, 
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businesses, this prohibition was significantly watered down in the Final Re-
port dated 19 December 2014.51 The final draft for a de1egated directives2 
was passed on 7 Apri12016 by the Comrnission: Article II introduces sev-
eral conditions which need to be met if the investment firm wishes to en-
hance the quality ofthe relevant service by receiving inducements ("quality 
enhancement test"53). Commission-based advice is therefore still permitted, 
but the standard of quality must be significantly higher than before. 
d) The search for a suitable third way: robo advice 
German influence to retain the present forms of comrnission-based advice 
was impossible to ignore. As long as commission-based advice remains free 
of charge, there is no protection against the investment firm recommending 
its own financial products instead of objectively searching the market for 
the most suitable products for the client. Therefore, fee-based advice is an 
important complement to commission-based advice. The positive aspect 
about fee-based advice is that the classic conflict of interest is no Ionger 
present However, at EUR 15(}-350 per hour, fee-based advice does not 
come cheap. lt nonnally does not make sense unless the investor has an 
investment sum of at least EUR 50,000. Fee-based advice is effectively ex-
c1uded for I arge sections of the population. Although fee-based advice has 
available at https://www.esmaeuropa.eu/sites/default/filesllibrary/20 15/ 11 /2014-
549 _-_consultation__paper_mifid_ii_-_mifrr.pdf ( 15-09-20 17). 
51 Commissions should be allowed ifa client receives one ofthe followi.ng services: 
imestment advice and access to a wide range of products, including third-party 
products, investment advice and regular appropriateness assessments, or other reg-
ular services, or access to a wide range ofproducts, including third-party products, 
and regular reports about value increases and costs or other information tools; see 
Final Report ESMA/2014/1569, 19.12.2014, p. 127 ff., available at 
https:hwww.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/filesllibrary/20 15/11/2014-1569 _fmal_ 
report_-_esmas_technical_advice_to_the_commission_on_mifid_ii_and_ 
mifir.pdf ( 15-09-20 17). 
52 Commission Delegated Directive (EU) of 7.4.2016 supplementing Directive 
20 14/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to safe-
guardiog of financial instruments aod funds belonging to clients. product govern-
ance obligations and the rules applicable to the provision or reception of fees, 
commissions or any monetary or oon-monetary benefits, C(20 16) 2031 final , 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/financeldocs/level-2-measures/mifid-delegated-
regulation-20 16-2031 .pdf ( 15-09-20 17). 
53 Art. 24(9) MiFID 11. 
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already been available in Gennany for many years, it is not used much by 
investors. 54 Moreover, it would be overly patemalistic to allow for only one 
form of advice- each has its own advantages and disadvantages. 
A third way is already being developed in the US - for example, robo 
advice, or computer algorithms that replace traditional investment advice.55 
Also in Germany, investment fums are starting to offer automated "assis-
tants" via the lntemet to support individuaJs in their investment decision.56 
Some banks offer automated advice as a eheaper alternative to a fee-based 
face-to-face adviceY Others do not regard this "assistance" or "guidance" 
as advice, but only as a provision of information to support the individual 
client in its own investment decision.58 The referral to the "client's own 
investment decision" does not move "assistance" outside the scope of in-
vestment advice and its associated public law obligations in Section 31 et 
seqq. WpHG. Ln the case ofinvestment advice, the final investment decision 
is also made by the client and not by the investment firm. Only in the case 
of portfolio management is the decision made by the investment firm and 
not by the individual client 59 According totheGerman definition in Section 
2(3) I No 9 WpHG, investment advice "means the provision of personal 
54 For arguments in favour and against, see Thomas M.J . Möllers in Heribert Hirte 
and Thomas M.J. Möllers (eds), K.K-WpHG (2nd Edition, 2014), §§ 36c, 36d, pa-
ras. 9 et seqq.; Hans Christoph Grigoleit, 177 (20 13) Zeitschrift fiJr das gesamte 
Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht (ZHR), 264 (297); Mauritz Poppele, Kapital-
marktinvestmentprodukte (20 15), 452. 
55 On "robo advice" (offered in the US by Betterment, Wealthfront, Jemstep, and 
Personal Capital) see Gerald Braunberger, Der Roboter als Anlageberater, FAZ, 
12.6.20 14, available at http://www. faz.net/aktuell/finanLenlmeine-finanzen/spa-
ren-und-geld-anlegen/robo-advice-der-roboter-als-anlageberater-12969006.html 
( 15-09-20 17); Kim Bode. Empfohlen vom Computer, Die Zeit, 8.1.20 15, 26 ( 13-
02-2017). 
56 See, for example, in Germany by comdirect, available at https://jetzt-besser-geld-
anlegen.comdirectde/start ( 15-09-20 17). 
57 Emma Dunldey, RBS cuts face-to-face service and brings in 'robo-advisors ', Fi-
nancial Times. 13.3.2016, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/10df9f22-e90f-
11 e5-bb79-2303682345c8.html#ax.zz48KdWSNAp ( 13-02-20 17). 
58 Emma Dunkley, RBS cuts face-to-face service and brings in 'robo-advisors ', Fi-
nancial Times, 13.3.2016; for an example, see the "disclaimer" provided by 
comdirect, avaiblate at https://jetzt-besser-geld-anlegen.comdirect.de/start. (15-
09-2017). 
59 For the distinction, see the definitions in sec. 2(3) No 9 WpHG (= investment ad-
vice) and sec. 2(3) No 7 WpHG (portfolio management); see Thomas M.J. Möllers 
in Heribert llirte and Thomas M.J. Möllers (eds), KK-WpHG (2nd Edition, 2014), 
§ 31 , paras. 330 et seqq. 
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recommendations to a client [ ... ] in respect of one or more transactions re-
lating to financial instruments [ ... ]." The definition is activity-based.60 
Therefore, a reference by the investment firm that the provided service is 
not deemed tobe investment advice does not influence the legal qualifica-
tion of the activity under the WpHG. As long as the service provided via 
the Internet Ieads to a recommendation relating to specific financial instru-
ments which take into account the client's personal circumstances, or at 
least are presented as suitable for the person, the activity falls under the 
definition of investment advice.61 Thus it depends on the specific questions 
asked on the "robo" homepage for the qualification as financial advice. Fi-
nally, as the investment advice needs to be made to "a client", there must 
be some contractual relationship.62 But the protection provided by the 
WpHG already starts earlier: it also covers "potential investors".63 Invest-
ment finns can in fact stray into an implicit personal recommendation even 
though there is no registration process and no contractual relationship. 
lt would be helpful to include such alternative fonns of advice in the laws 
by way of example. Doing so would, on the one hand, encourage the devel-
opment of alternative forms of advice; on the other hand, a legal qualifica-
tion of"robo advice'' by the legislator should help to navigate the boundary 
between providing guidance based on the customer's situation and to avoid 
inadvertently straying into an implicit personal recommendation without 
fulfilling alllegal requirements. Banks remain reluctant to use such form of 
infonnation provision because ofthese legal uncertainties.64 A clarification 
may also prevent market participants from trying to circumvent obligations 
when providing "automated assistance" which Iooks like advice to the client 
but is not regarded as such by the investment fmn. 
60 See Petra Buck-Heeb, Zeitschriftflir Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) 2013, 1401 (1409). 
61 Sec. 2(3) sentence I No 9 WpHG; seealso Art. 52 ofthe Directive 2006/73/EC of 
10 August 2006 implementing Directive 2004/39/EG ofthe European Parliament 
and ofthe Council (MiFID I) as regards organizational requirements and operating 
conditions for investment finns and defined tenns for the purpose of that Di-
rective. 
62 Petra Buck-Heeb, Zeitschriftfor Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) 2013, 1401 (1409). 
63 See Art. 52 of the Implementing Directive 2006173/EC (n 61 ); Harald Baum in 
Heribert Hirte and Thomas M.J. Möllers (eds), KK-WpHG (2nd Edition, 2014, § 2, 
para. 189; lleinz-Dieter Assmann in Heinz-Dieter Assmann and Uwe H. Schnei-
der (eds), WpHG (6th Edition, 2012), § 2, para. 114. 
64 Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), Financia/ Advice Market Review, Final Re-
port (March 2016), p. 28 et seq., available at https://www.fca.org.uk/staticlfcal 
documents/famr-final-report.pdf ( 15-09-20 17). 
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To foster this third way for investment advice or guidance, a joint commit-
tee on the European Ievel published a discussion paper on automation in 
financial advice last year. 65 The Financial Conduct A uthority and the Treas-
ury in Great Britain already started a consultation66 on possible benefits of 
robo advice, especially to those with small sums to invest. The results were 
published in a final report as part ofthe "Financial Advice Market Review". 
lt recommended a clarification of the legal framework for robo advice by 
suggesting two different categories: one which is only "guidance" to the 
client without a personal recommendation,67 and the other called "stream-
lined advice" for a limited range on simple customer needs.68 All other 
forrns of advice need to be personal and may not only use an automated 
process.69 This should help market participants to avoid slipping uninten-
tionally into advice and its associated liability risks. 
lt seems worthwhile to keep an eye on this new promising development, 
as "guidance" could help customers to choose a third wa} for investment 
decisions: an independent but, most importantly, nevertheless informed in-
vestment decision. This development fits also into today's changes: increas-
ing use of technology, greater awareness of the cost of advice and a huge 
distrust in fmancial advisors.70 
II. Law enforcement: principles vs. ru/es 
I. Recent development: a shift from principles to rules 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the European Union and legislators 
all over the world passed a "tsunami" of new provisions to eliminate con-
tlicts of interest and unsound rnarket behaviour which were key factors of 








Joint Comminee ofthe European Supervisory Authorities. Joint Commirtee Dis-
cussion Paper on auromalion in financial advice (4.12.2015), availab1e at 
hnps: /www.eba.europa.eUJdocuments/1 0180 1299866 JC+ 20 15+080+Discus-
sion+Paper+on.,...automation+in+financia1+advice.pdf ( 15-09-20 17). 
Financial Advice Market Review (n 64). 
Financial Advice Market Review (n 64), 33 (Recommendation 3). 
Financial Advice Market Review (n 64), 35 (Recommendation 4). 
Financial Advice Market Review (n 64), 29. 
Financial Advice Market Review (n 64), 3. 
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regimes, prudential oversight, and risk management, and ensure that all fi-
nancial markets, products and participants are regulated or subject to over-
sight"71. It seems questionable whether a flood of detailed rules is the ap-
propriate instrument to close all existing gaps and at the same time to con-
stitute a legal framework anticipating also potential future developments in 
the financial industry. This development may also be observed in the law 
regulating investment advice. The German regulation in Section 31 WpHG 
originally consisted of two principles-based subsections in 1994.72 More 
than 20 years later, it has increased to 16 subsections as of 3 July 20 16; 73 
and the implementation of the MiFID n is still pending!74 Closing every 
kind of legalloophole and regulating every imaginable situation has already 
failed in history: an illustrative example was the "Preußisches Landrecht" 
of 1794 with its 19,000 sections. A higher Ievel of abstraction combined 
with the court's ability to interpret and develop the law is a more effective 
way to provide legal certainty and flexibility. 
While rules are quite inflexible in their application, principles might 
serve this flexibility. Great Britain's financial system has traditionally been 
principles-based regulated (PBR) for a long time.75 The Financial Conduct 
Authority's (FCA) Handbook of Rules and Guidelines is a plain-vanilla 
piece of PBR sening out the most important standards for firms in the fi-
nancial industry. During its "Treating Customers Fairly" (TCF) initiative 
based on Principle 6 of the Handbook, the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA, predecessor ofthe FCA) published six approach-based requirements 
to a "product life cycle". ln 2006, the FSA de.clared the initiative a "core 
71 G20, Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, 
Washington 2008, 3, ava.ilable at http://www.un.orgfga/president/63/comrnis-
sion/declarationG20.pdf (15-09-20 17). 
72 The third subsection prescribed the scope for foreign investment finns. See the old 
version ofsec. 31 WpHG ofthe Securities Trading Act ( Wertpapierhandelsgeset=) 
introduced by Art. I of the Second Act for the Promotion of Financial Markets 
(Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgeset::) from 26 Ju1y 1994. 
73 As imp1emented by the First FiMaNoG (n 33). 
74 MiFID II will be imp1emented by the Second FiMaNoG by tbe end of2017 (n 8). 
75 Julia B1ack, Martyn Hopper and Christa Band, 'Making a success of Principles-
based regulation ' I (2007) Law and Financial Markers Review (LFMR), 192; Ju1ia 
Black. ' Regulatory Styles and Supervisory Strategies' in Niarnh Moloney, Eills 
Ferran and Jennifer Payne (eds), T/ze Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation 
(20 15), 217 (228); Financial Services Authority (FSA), Princip/es-based regula-
tion, Focusing on the outcomes tlzat matter (April 2007), availab1e at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uklpubs/other/principles.pdf ( 15-09-20 17). 
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part of our move to a more principles-based approach to regulation"76; later 
the development was interpreted as a shift from "principles-based" to "out-
come-focused" regulation.77 But times changed the trust in the success of 
the PBR. The experieoces of regulators during the financial crisis led to the 
conclusion that a "principles-based approach does not work with individu-
als who have no principles"78• The FCA started to work on more prescrip-
tive rules on how to achieve the intended outcome of the regulation. Pres-
sure to abandon a predominantly purposive and principles-based system 
came also from the EU by introducing a "Single Rulebook" for capital re-
quirements with its detailed rules.79 One might describe the new system as 
a "principles-based regulation in rule design and operation"80. The South 
African regulation has gone through the same stages as Great Britain.81 
2. Regulation 
The Concept of PBR has several advantages but is still one of the most 









Financial Services Authority (FSA), Treating customers fairly towards fair out-
comes for consumers (July 2006), 5, available at http://www. fca.org.uklstaticlfca/ 
documents/fsa-tcf-towards.pdf ( 15-09-20 I 7). 
Julia Black, ' Regulatory Styles and Supervisory Strategics' in Niamh Moloney, 
Eills Ferran and Jennifer Payne (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regu-
lation (20 I 5), 217 (232). 
Hector Sants, Delivering Intensive Regulation and Credible Deterrence. Speech 
delivered to the Reuters Newsmakers Event on 12.3.2009, available at 
http://www. fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2009/03 I 2 _ 
bs.shtml {15-09-2017). 
Regulation (EU) No 575120 IJ of the European Parliarnent and of the Council of 
26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment 
firms; Directive 20 13/36/EU ofthe European Parliarnent and of the Council of26 
J~~e 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential super-
VJSIOn of credit institutions and investment fmns. 
See Ju~ia Black, 'Regulatory Stylesand Supervisory Strategies' in Niarnh Molo-
ney, Ellls Ferran and Jennifer Payne (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Financial 
Regulation (20 15), 217 (238). 
Fo~ a detailed description see Darleen Millard, p. 186 above. 
J~ha Black, 'Regulatory Styles and Supervisory Strategies' in Niamh Moloney, 
E1lis Ferran and Jennifer Payne (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regu-
lation (20 15), 217 (228). 
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prescriptive rules, principles are drafted with a high Ievel of generality, be-
ing purposive and expressing the reason behind the regulation.83 lt enables 
the regulator to react tlexibly to new developments or market circumstances 
in the financial sector, whereas detailed rules might not retlect or suit these 
new conditions. Moreover, it prohibits "creative compliance"84, where mar-
ket participants fulfil the detailed provision but the underlying objective 
might still be undennined. But principles also provide tlexibility to market 
participants: by stating only the objective ofthe regulation, it is on the firm 
which processes and actions they want to implement to achieve the given 
outcome (''outcomes-based regulation"). lt is based on the assumption that 
market participants have the expertise and best insight to find the most ef-
ficient steps to comply with the regulation.85 
The most important concem is the principles' Iack of transparency and 
the uncertainty they produce for market participants. Therefore, regulated 
entities and public authorities are in regular exchange about the application 
ofthe principles. This "informal communication" may Iead to a non-trans-
parent administration. Others raise the concem of"agency capture", where 
market participants attempt to intluence illegitimately the regulatory 
agency's understanding ofthe principles.86 A Iack oftransparency may even 
raise constitutional concems: it might violate the principle of nonnative 
clarity (Normk/arheit) which is applicable in all EU Member States via their 
constitutional traditions. 87 
83 Julia Black. Martyn Hopper and Christa Band, 'Making a success of Principles-
based regulation' I (2007) Law and Financial Markeis Review (LFMR), 192 et 
seq.; Fabian Walla, 'Rechtssetzungsverfahren und Regulierungsstrategien' in 
ROdiger V eil (ed), Europaisches Kapitalmarktrecht (2nd Edition, 2014), 38 (54 et 
seq.). 
84 See the wording in Julia Black. Martyn Hopperand Christa Band, 'Making a suc-
cess of Principles-based regulation' I (2007) Law and Financial Markets Review 
(LFMR), 192, 204 n 7. 
85 Julia Black. Martyn Hopper and Christa Band, 'Making a success of Principles-
based regulation' I (2007) Law and Financial Markets Review (LFMR), 192 et 
seq.; Fabian Walla. ' Rechtssetzungsverfahren und Regulierungsstrategien' in 
ROdiger V eil ( ed), Europäisches Kapitalmarktrecht (2nd Edition, 20 14). 38 (54 et 
seq.). 
86 Fabian Walla, ·Rechtssetzungsverfahren und Regulierungsstrategien ' in Radiger 
V eil (ed), Europiiisches Kapitalmarktrecht (2nd Edition, 2014), 38 (56 et seq.). 
87 Originally developed by the European Court of Justice, Case 4173, 14.5.1974 J. 
Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v Commission ofthe Europeon Commu-
nilies, ECLI:EU:C: 1974:51 , para. 13; today enacted in Art. 6 ofthe Treaty on the 
European Union (TEU); see Meinhard Hilf and Frank Schorkopf in Eberhard 
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Moreover, regulators tend to issue guidelines which represent their under-
standing ofthe principle at issue. But guidelines themselves produce further 
problems: they Iead to a fragmented regulation depending on "special 
cases".88 They may also raise constitutional concems: it is the legislator's 
power to enact and substantiate the essential parts of laws and not the ad-
ministration's power to do so.89 
3. Public and private enforcement 
The effectiveness ofprinciples is dependent on the ability to enforce them. 
Where principles provide flexibility to supervisors by enabling them to re-
act to new developments, flexibility may also weaken enforcement: regula-
tors might develop a very conservative interpretation and practice of prin-
ciples, especially where there is no political willingness for tough enforce-
ment actions (''paradox of Supervision and enforcemenf-90). 
Most principles in the FSA's Handbook constitute only public Obliga-
tionsand no private rights.91 Consequently, pressure to comply with the un-
derlying principles can only come from public and not from private law 
enforcement. But this is a well-known problern not only with principles: 
jurisdictions in all ofEurope are struggling whether rules and principles for 
market conduct only constitute public obligations or whether they ma) gen-
erate private liability.92 In Germany, an investor may not automatically re-
ceive damages within the meaning of Section 823 (2) of the Civil Code 







Grabitz, Meinhard Hilfand Martin Nettesheim (eds), Das Recht der EuropiJischen 
Union (4()1h Edition 2010), Art. 6 EUV, paras. 6 et seqq.; Fabian Walla, 'Rechts-
setzungsverfahren und Regulierungsstrategien' in RUdiger Veil (ed), Europäi-
sches Kapitalmarktrecht (2nd Edition, 2014), 38 (56 et seq.). 
Julia Black.. Martyn Hopper and Christa Band, 'Making a success of Principles-
based regulation' I (2007) Law and Financia/ Markets Review (LFMR), 197. 
According to the Principles ofMateriality ( Wesentlichkeitsgrundsatz} in Gcrmany, 
Art. 80( I) sentence 2 of the German Constitution. 
Julia Black., ' Forrns and paradoxes ofprinciples-based regulation' 3 (2008) Com-
mon Markets Law Journal (CML/), 427, 450. 
Julia Black, Martyn Hopper and Christa Band, 'Making a success of Principles-
based regulation' I (2007) Law and Financia/ Markers Review (LFMR). 192, 204 
n 4. 
See for a discussion of private liability under MiFID I and 11: Thomas M.J. Möl-
lers, 'Harmonisation of Capital Markets Law - MiFID 11 and PRJIP' 31 (20 15) 
Banking and Finance Law Review (8. F.L. R.) 143 ( 163 et seqq. ) .. 
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obligation under the WpHG.93 The results even differ between EU Member 
States: whereas there is no civil law enforcement of Section 20a WpHG 
(market manipulation) in Gerrnany,94 courts in Austria do award damages 
in this respect.95 
However, the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR)96 has imparted new im-
petus to the debate regarding the granring of damages according to Section 
823(2) BGB for a violation of obligations under the European regulation in 
Gerrnany.97 The prohibition of market manipulation (Articles 12 and 15 
MAR) as weil as the obligation of public disclosure of inside inforrnation 
(Article 17 MAR) are now regulated on the European Ievel. For the first 
time European market abuse Iaw explicitly mentions the goal to "enhance 
investor protection and confidence in those markets" in Article I MAR, 
which is a strong point for the Obligation of the German legislature to im-
plement private enforcement of the above-mentioned two European rules 
via Section 823(2) BGB.98 Others argue that a private Iiability needs to be 
93 BGH 22.6.20 I 0 - VI ZR 212/09- BGHZ 186. 58 paras. 26 et seqq. re sec. 34a( I) 
sentence I WpHG; BGH 19.2.2008 -XI ZR 17()/07 - BGHZ 175, 276 para. 18 
with further evidence to sec. 32 (I) sentence I WpHG; BGH 13.12.2011- XI ZR 
51 / 10 - BGHZ 192,91 paras. 20 et seqq. - IKB on sec. 20a WpHG. 
94 BGH 13.12.201 I - XI ZR 51/10 - BGHZ 192, 91 , 97 et seqq.- IKB; Sebastian 
Mock in Heribert Hirte and Thomas M.J. Möllers (eds), KK-WpHG (2nd Edition, 
2014), § 20a, paras. 474 et seqq.; for private enforcement see ROdiger V eil, 'Sank-
tionen' in RUdiger V eil ( ed), Europäisches Kapitalmarktrecht (2nd Edition, 20 14 ), 
163 (182etseq.). 
95 Susanne Kalss, Manin Oppitz and Johannes Zollner, Kapitalmarktrecht - System 
(2nd Edition, 2015), § 22, paras. 72 et. seqq.; seealso OGH, 15.3.2012- 6 Ob 
28/12d -GES 2012,230,5.2 et seqq. 
96 Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 ofthe European Parliament and ofthe Council of 
16 April2014 on market abuse (market abuse regulation) and repealing Directive 
2003 6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Di-
rectives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004n21EC (MAR). 
97 For an overview over the debate regarding private enforcement under MAR, see 
Alexander I lellgardt, Die Aktiengesellschaft (AG) 2012, 154 (163 et seqq.); Chris-
toph II. Seibt, 177 (20 13) Zeitschrift for das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaft-
recht (ZHR), 388 (424 et seqq.); Lars Klöhn, ·Die private Durchsetzung des 
Marktmanipulationsverbots' in Susanne Katss, Holger Fleischerand Hans-Ueli 
Vogt (eds), Gesellschafts- und Kapitalmarktrecht in Deutschland, Osterreich und 
der Schweiz 20 I 3 (20 13), 227- 249; Hartmut Krause, Corporate Compliance Zeit-
schrift (CCZ) 2014, 248 (260). 
98 Alexander Hellgardt, Die Aktiengesellschaft (AG) 2012, 154 ( 164 et seq.); Dörte 
Poelzig. Zeitschrift for Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht (ZGR) 2015, 80 I 
(815). 
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granted as a matter of effectiveness and equiva1ence.99 A specific argument 
for private enforcement in case of information-based market manipulation 
(Art. 12 (I) c) MAR) could be found in Recita147 phrase 4 ofthe MAR, as 
this form of manipulation "is particularly harmful to investors because it 
causes them to base their investment decisions on incorrect or distorted in-
formation".1 00 For liability under Art. 17 MAR, Recital 49 states that "the 
public disclosure of inside information [ ... ] is essential [ ... ] to ensure that 
investorsarenot misled". 101 Besides Section 37b, c WpHG, which already 
explicitly grants damages to investors who were misled by false or deferred 
ad-hoc disclosures in Gennany, there would still be scope for Section 823 
(2) BGB in connection with Art. 17 MAR, asslight and average negligence 
ofthe disclosing firm is sufficient for a liability under Section 823 (2) BGB. 
On the other hand, there would still be room for Section 37b, c WpHG be-
sides Section 823 (2) BGB because it reverses the burden of proof for ab-
sence ofnegligence on the disclosing fum. 102 It will be interesting how Ger-
man courtswill deal with these new arguments in future decisions. 
The same discussion can be expanded to the liability of investment firms 
in case ofviolating obligations under Section 31 WpHG . The German Fed-
eral Supreme Court (BGH) has rejected claims for damages under Section 
823 (2) BGB so far. 103 According to the European Court of Justice, MiFID 
99 Alexander llellgardt, Die Aktiengesellschafl (AG) 2012, 154 ( 165); Christoph H. 
Seiht, 177 (2013) Zeitschrift fiJr das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht 
(ZHR), 388 (424); Christoph H. Seiht and Berward Wollenschläger, Die Aktienge-
sellschaft (AG) 2014, 593 (607); Dorte Poelzig, Zeitschrift }Ur Unternehmens- und 
Gesellschaftsrecht (ZGR) 2015, 80 I (816); for arguments against liahility for mar-
ket-hased manipulation see Lars Klöhn, ' Die private Durchsetzung des Marktma-
nipulationsverbots ' in Susanne Kalss, Holger Fleischerand Hans-Ueli Vogt (eds), 
Gesellschafts- und Kapitalmarletrecht in Deutschland, Osterreich und der Schweiz 
2013 (2013), 227 (248 et seq.). 
100 Alexander Hellgardt, Die Aktiengesellschaft (AG) 2012, 154 ( 165); Dörte Poelzig. 
Zeitschrift fiJr Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht (ZGR) 2015, 80 I (8 15). 
101 Al~xander Hellgardt, Die AlcJiengesellschafl (AG) 2012, 154 (164); Cluistoph H. 
Seaht, 177 (2013) Zeitschrift jUr das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht 
(ZHR), 388 (424); Christopb H. Seiht and Berward WollenschUlger, Die Aktienge-
sellschaft (AG) 2014, 593 (607). 
102 Christoph H. Seiht, 177 (2013) Zeitschrift for das gesamte Handels- und Wirf-
schaftsrecht (ZHR), 388 (425 et seq.). 
103 BGH 19.12.2006- XI ZR 56105 - BGHZ 170, 226 paras. 17 et seqq. re Section 
31(1) No 2 WpHG; BGH 13. 12.2011 -XI ZR 51/10 - BGHZ 192,91, para. 26-
IKB : WpiiG only public law and therefore no qualification under sec. 823(2) 
BGB. 
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r does not oblige member states to implement civillaw Liability in case of a 
violation of Art. 19 MiFID I, which is the European background to Section 
31 WpHG. lt is up to the intemal legal order of each Member State to de-
termine the contractual consequences of non-compliance subject to ob-
servance of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. 104 1t is ques-
tionable whether this ruling under MiFID I is transferrable to MiFID H: 
Recital 70 of MiFID II states that "[t]he continuous relevance of personal 
recommendations for clients and the increasing complexity of services and 
instruments require enhancing the conduct of business obligations in order 
to strengthen the protection of investors". Recital 74 provides significant 
evidence that further restriction of inducements under Article 24(9) MiFID 
II was implemented to protect investors. Finally, one ofthe overall objec-
tives ofthe directive is explicitly 'to protect investors" 105• Further, Recital 
86 sentence 2 states: "in order to enhance the regulatory framework appli-
cable to the provision ofservices [ ... ,] principles to act honestly, fairly and 
professionally and the obligation to be fair, clear and not misleading apply 
to the relationship with any clients". MiFID ll is clearly referring to a con-
tractual obligation which the investment firm owes to its client, 106 which is 
a strong argument for a '·double nature"' ofSection 31 et seqq. WpHG: On 
the one hand, the national regulator enforces the obligation and on the other 
hand, the investment firm owes all obligations to the client. 107 These argu-
ments, which indicate that the focus ofthe directive is increasingly shifting 
towards investor protection108, might increase the pressure on national 
courts to enforce Section 31 et seqq. WpHG via civillaw. Up until now, the 
104 European Court of Justice Case 604/11, 30.5.2013, Genil48 SL, Comercial Hos-
telera de Grandes Vmos SL v Bankinter SA, Banco ßilbao VizcayaArgentaria SA, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013 :344. para. 57 re Art. 19 MiFLD I. 
I 05 See Recital 86 sentence I MiFTD II; see Dorothee Einsele, 180 (20 16) Zeitschrift 
for das gesant Handels- und Wirtschajlsrecht (lHR}, 233 (241, 244). 
I 06 Dorothee Einsele, 180 (20 16) Zeitschrift for das gesant I landels- und Wirtschajls-
recht (lHR), 233 (241 ). 
107 Franz Clemens Leisch. Informationspflichten nach § 31 WpHG (2004), 44 et 
seqq.; Thomas M.J. Möllers in Heribert Hirte and Thomas M.J. Möllers (eds), KK-
WpHG (2"" Edition, 2014 ), § 31 para. 15; Christoph Benicke, Wertpapiervermö-
gensverwaltung (2006), 457 et seqq.; Ti Iman Weichert and Thomas G. Wennin-
ger, Wertpapier-Mitteilungen (JfiM) 2007, 627 (635); foradifferent view see An-
dreas Fuchs in Andreas Fuchs (ed), WpHG Kommentar (2nd Edition, 2016), Yor-
bem §§ 31 ff. paras. 78 et seqq.; Dorothee Einsele, 180 (2016) Zeitschrift for das 
gesant Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht (lHR), 233 (247 et seqq.). 
108 Recitals under MiFID I stated " investor protection" only twice, whereas under 
MiFID it can be found 22 times. 
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BGH has been reluctant to do so, but the principle of equivalence and ef-
fectiveness might call for private enforcement in the future.109 
European Competition Lav. is already one tep ahead: The dtrective on 
actions for damages for infringements of national and EU competition 
adopted in 20 14' 10 will hannonise national private law enforcement from 
27 December 20 16 when member states shall have adopted measures to 
comply with the directive. 111 
4. Principles as a second layer ofregulation and enforcement 
Whereas there are several concems regarding the regulation and enforce-
ment via principles, a combination ofrules and principle~ could be an ade-
quate regulatory framework for markets with a high degrec of innovation. 
These markets give rise to risks of circumvention and market abu e. 112 In 
particular the above-mentioned automatton of inve tment advice could be 
regulated by principles as long as the legislature has not reacted to thi ne\ 
market development. A regulation \ia principle as a econd la)er has 
proven effective in cases in Great Britain, where upervt ors \\cre not able 
to sanction a specific behaviour under the Financial ef\ice-. nnd Markets 
Act 2000 (FSMA), which implements the European rulcs. but under Prin-
ciples ofthe FSA Handbook. 113 However. when drafling principle . the leg-
I 09 Dorothee Einsele, 180 (20 16) Zellschrift for das g 'fOnt 1/andds· und ll'lrt ch.J_fts-
recht (lHR), 233 (242 et seq.). 
110 Directive 2014 104 EU ofthe European Parliament and ofthe Council of26 Ko-
vember 2014 on certain rules go\eming action fbr dama e under nataonal Ia\~ 
for infringements of the competition law provi ion of the Mcmbcr "itates of the 
European Union: see Joc;ef Drexel, 'The lntcra,tion Bct\\ccn Pmate and Public 
Enforcement in Europenn Competition Law ·in Han -Wollgang Mid..lill and ~­
drea Wechsler (eds). The Transformation of En{orcement (2016), 135-159. 
III For a comparison of eh il Ia\\ enforcement bel\\een compctition. antitrust. com-
pany and capatat markets law in Gennan) and Europe. sec T'homas M.J. MOIIers 
and ~emhard Pregler, 'Ci\il La" Enforcement and Colle,ti\e Redte" in Eco-
no~ac Law', 2013 Diritti \a::ionali e Compara::1one. 21- 14 . 
ll2 Fa~aan Walla, 'Rechtssetzungsverfahren und Regulierungsstrategien· in ROdiger 
Veal (ed), Europaisches Kapaalmarktrecht (2 Edition. 2014 ). 38 (57 et seq.). 
ll3 ;or an exampl~, see Financial mices Authorit) (I A). Fmal \'otice, 
0.!1.2006, avrulable at http: W\\\\ fca.org.ulJ tatic pub final pignatelli.pdf 
( 15-09-20 17). 
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islature and the regulators should keep in mind the above-mentioned con-
stitutional concems. 114 In the end, '·neither principles nor rules usually func-
tion particularly successfully without the other•115 .1 16 
IIJ. Conc/uding remarks 
The period of deregulation in the 1980s and l990s was blamed as one of 
the key factors of the last financial crisis. The activism and political will-
ingness to draft new rules and ensure a gapless regulation is tremendous. 
Not only Britain 117 and South Africa118, which have traditionally been prin-
ciples-based regulated, but also Germany119 and the whole European Union 
are currently shifting to a regulatory system which is characterised by an 
overwhelming complexity and amount of meticulously detailed rules. The 
intention ofthe European legislature to draft a Single Rulebook for a Capital 
Markets Union120 is worthy ofsupport. A uniform and strong framework to 
foster market integrity and decrease regulatory arbitrage and legal complex-
ity arising from differing national rules are often cited goals of new Euro-
pean laws. 121 
Three notes on complexity: First, harrnonisa~ion of nationallaws via Eu-
ropean directives and regulations may in fact reduce divergences among 
nationallaws. But seen from anational perspective, it adds three more lay-
ers of European Jaw and guidelines via the Lamfalussy-Process to the ex-
isting national laws. In Germany, market participants now have to comply 
114 Fabian Walla, ' Rechtssetzungsverfahren und Regulierungsstrategien ' in ROdiger 
V eil (ed), Europäisches Kapitalmarktrecht (2nd Edition, 2014), 38 (58). 
115 Julia Black, 'The rise, fall and fate ofprinciples-based regulation ' in Kern Alex-
ander and Niamh Moloney (eds), Law Reform and Financial Markets (201 1), 3 
(33). 
116 John Braightwaite, 'Rules and Principles: A Theory ofLegal Certainty' 27 (2002) 
Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy (Aust. J. Leg. Phi/.), 41. 
11 7 Julia Black, ' Regulatory Stylesand Supervisory Strategies· in Niamh Moloney, 
Eilis Ferran and Jennifer Payne (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regu-
lation (20 15), 217- 253. 
118 See Darteen Millard, p. 186 above. 
119 Thomas M.J. Möllers, 'Harmonisation of Capital Markets Law - MiFID 11 and 
PRliP' 31 (2015) Banking and Finance Law Review (B.F.L.R.) 143 (148 et seqq.). 
120 European Commission, Building a Capital Markets Union, Green Paper 
COM(20 15) 63 final , 18.2.20 I 5. 
12 I Seerecital 4 ofthe MAR (n 96); similarly in recital 3 and 4 ofthe PRI IP Regulation 
(n 28). 
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with six relevant legal levels.122 Second, the European laws tend to be ex-
cessive in size and fast-paced. Today it seems more important to find every 
applicable law than interpreting the law. Databases123 which structure this 
complexity are becoming more and more important, whereas Iiterature as 
German commentaries which try to interpret the law are already outdated 
on the day they are published.124 Third, as the Ievel of detail is impressive, 
the overall objectives and essential regulations get lost in the flood of ap-
plicable laws. For a long time, the US-American Capital Markets Law has 
served as a rote model for legislators in continental Europe. 125 But the flood 
of European legislative initiatives after the financial crisis even overshad-
owed US-American initiatives. A way back to a more outcomes-based reg-
ulation seems desirable. Great Britain might have taken one step closer to 
this "way back'' since 23 June 2016. 
122 Thomas M.J. Möllers, 'Harmonisation of Capital Markets Law- MiFID ll and 
PRJ1P' 31 (2015) Banking and Finance Law Review (B.F.L.R.) 143 (163 et seq.). 
123 See the author's database, available at kapitalmarktrecht-im-intemt.eu or 
cap1aw.eu. 
124 See for example the preface of Andreas Fuchs (ed), WpHG Kommentar (2nd Edi-
tion, 20 16), V; Ulrich Noack and Dirk Zetzsche, 'Kommentieren und Kommentare 
im europäisch-deutschen Wirtschaftsrecht' in Bettina Limperg, Jens Bormann, 
Axel C. Filges, Marie Luise Graf-Schlickerand Hanns PrOtting, Recht im Wandel 
europtiischer und deutscher RechJspolitik.: Festschrifl200 Jahre Carl Heymanns 
Verlag (20 15), 213 (226). 
125 For the development ofEuropean Capital Markets Law see Radiger V eil, 'Kapi-
talmarktrecht in Forschung und Lehre' in ROdiger V eil (ed), Europäisches Kapi-
talmarktrecht (2nd Edition, 2014), 83 (84 et seq.). 
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